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ABSTRACT
A case study was conducted on the managerial control of the
Chinese Economic Development Council (Housing and Land
Development Division) over programs and operations. Both
financial and nonfinancial factors were examined. The
discussion presumes a working knowledge of basic financial
and accounting concepts, the real property development
process, and of federal and Massachusetts' programs that fund
community development activity.
The results of the evaluation state that managerial control
over operations was generally good, but control over programs
is tenuous. Recommendations for improvement in managerial
control are proposed.
Thesis Supervisor: Frank Sidney Jones
Title: Ford Professor of Urban Affairs
Preface
This document is a case study of managerial control in
the Housing and Land Development Division of the Chinese
Economic Development Council, a community-based organization
headquartered in Boston's Chinatown. It is written as a
client-oriented document, i.e. as an evaluation of and
develops recommendations to the Chinese Economic Development
Council, towards the end of improving future organizational
performance. However, the case may be useful and relevant
to other nonprofit agencies, particularly those involved in
local-level community economic development. The discussion
presumes a working knowledge of basic financial and
accounting concepts, the real property development process,
and of federal and Massachusetts programs that fund
community development activity.
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Introduction
Economic development is the process through which
members of a society, through collective action, increase
the level and quality of their material and social
well-being over time. Community-based economic development
assumes that involvement of community residents is one of
the critical changes in existing institutional structures
that is necessary in the development process. In the eyes
of residents of low-income communities, community-based
efforts are necessary to overcome distributional inequities
and uneven development in the national economy. In terms of
overall urban development, community-based efforts provide a
third sector in the development process, which is able to
avoid some of the limitations faced by both the public and
private sectors.
As noted by Belden paniels (1), the concept of involving
residents of low-income communities in the economic
development process - usually through community-based
organizations - is relatively young, originating in the
mid-1960's. Because of its short history and inconsistent
(1) 5elden Daniels, Nancy Barbe, and Beth Siegal, "The
Experience and Potential of Community-Based Development," in
Expanding the Opportunity to Produce: Revitalizing the
American Economy Through New Enterprise Development, eds.
Robert Friedman and William Schweke (Washington, D.C.:
Corporation for Enterprise Development, 1981), p. 177.
- 4 -
~ifi ll 1 ' III iii 1
public-sector commitment, it is difficult to assess the
ultimate potential of community-based development efforts.
It is clear, however, that many of the promises of
community-based economic development have not been met.
Both Belden Daniels (2) and Paul Pryde (3) cite
managerial capacity as one of the most critical factors in
the development process. Without the capacity to produce,
all other resources and intentions are merely "latent,
untapped potential." "The lack of management skills or
organizational capacity is probably at the root of the vast
majority of unsuccessful community-based development
efforts."(4).
Two of the most important tasks facing managers are
planning and control. Planning involves deciding on what
should be done and how to do it, and control is assuring the
desired objectives are attained. Anthony and Herzlinger
identify three types of planning and control processes
prevalent in most organizations: strategic planning,
(2) Ibid.
(3) Paul L. Pryde, "Human Capacity and Local Development
Enterprise," in Expanding the Opportunity to Produce:
Revitalizing the American Economy Through New Enterprise
Development, eds. Robert Friedman and William Scheweke
(Washington, D.C.: Corporation for Enterprise Development,
1981), pp. 525-33.
(4) Daniels, Barbe, and Siegal, "Community-Based
Development," p. 8.
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operational control, and management control (5). This
thesis will focus mainly on the management control process
within a community-based organization in downtown Boston.
In the management control process, the goals and
strategies arrived at in the strategic planning process are
accepted as given; management control focuses on the
implementation of the strategies. This process does not
involve the daily operating decisions that are the focus of
operational control, but it does aim to ensure that these
operations are carried out properly. "Management control is
defined as the process by which management assures that the
organization carries out its strategies effectively and
efficiently."(6)
There are four principal steps in the formal management
control process: 1) programming, 2) budgeting, 3) operating
and measurement, and 4) reporting and analysis. Such a
system embraces all aspects of the organization's operations
so as to assure that all parts of the operation are in
balance with each other. It is also helpful if the system
encourages goal congruence, i.e. is structured such that
goals of individuals within the agency are consistent with
(5) Robert H. Anthony and Regina E. Herzlinger, Management
Control in Nonprofit Organizations (Homewood: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1980), pp. 2-3.
(6) Ibid.
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organizational goals. Furthermore, a good management
control system is usually related to its financial
structure, in order to provide a "unifying core" around
which other types of information can be related.
There are, however, certain characteristics of
non-profit organizations that affect the management control
processes in those organizations. Some of the most
important ones include (7):
1. Problems are created by the absence of a
satisfactory, single, overall measure of
performance that is comparable to the profit
measure used in for-profit enterprises.
Performance measurement, centralization of
decisions, comparisons between units. and
between costs and benefits, and management
control is much more difficult to attain or
measure as a result.
2. Most nonprofit organizations - because of a
heavy dependence on a constrained funding
base - have little freedom to choose the
types of activities in which it will
engage, and the ways in which it will
compete in that (those) industries. Nor can
they usually change those strategies if
management decides that a change is
desirable.
3. Some nonprofit organizations are
'public-supported', i.e. they receive a
significant amount of financial support from
sources other than revenues from services
rendered. There is usually no connection in
these agencies between the services received
and the resources provided, complicating
future planning regarding the level of
production of goods and/or services.
(7) Ibid., pp. 34-50.
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In addition, the lack of direct
accountability to the client can virtually
eliminate the motivations associated with
market forces (and incentives to use
resources wisely).
Furthermore, as a substitute for the market
resource allocation mechanism, managers must
compete among themselves for scarce
resources. This is further complicated by
the parallel necessity to satisfy the
demands of those providing resources to the
agency.
4. In many nonprofit organizations, the
governing board is designed to represent the
public (or respective community's)
interest. However, decisions that protect
the public interest are much more difficult
to reach than the course of action that will
lead to increased profits in a for-profit
firm. This could lead to a lessening of
influence of the governing board in a
nonprofit agency.
5. An additional characteristic of most
public-supported organizations is the
relatively low monetary compensation of top
management. This is probably due to a lack
of understanding on the part of the public
and those who control fund sources of the
importance of the management function, and
the use of compensation as a motivating
device. This deficiency is compounded by
the belief that non-profit organizations
should not use bonuses or other types of
incentives.
6. Nonprofit organizations, for the most part,
are still practicing 19th-century-era
fiduciary accounting. They have not "grown
with the times" and adopted some of the 20th
century accounting and management control
concepts. These new practices could furnish
additional useful information about the
business both to parties external to the
organization and internal management. These
concepts include the accrual concept, cost
accounting, standard costs and variance
analysis, budgeting, responsibility
accounting, and programming.
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Essentially, this paper will examine the administrative
and coordinative capacity of the Chinese Economic
Development Council in dealing with financial and general
management problems encountered in its economic development
efforts. For the sake of simplicity, I will examine one
division (Housing and Land Development) of the agency; the
types of projects developed and organizational methods of
implementing them are assumed to be representative of the
agency as a whole.
The Housing and Land Development Division consists of
one line manager, responsible for two projects. The "Oxford
Place Project" is a 39-unit family housing proposal to be
located on Oxford Street, approximately one-half block from
the heart of Boston's Chinese Business District. The other
project, "31 Beach Street", is an 11-story office building
acquired by CEDC in 1979 for income-generating purposes (and
possible subsequent development into low-income housing).
My evaluation of this division assumes two forms: 1) that of
an efficiency evaluation by examining day-to-day operational
management, and 2) a (results-oriented) project management
effectiveness review.
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Description of the Chinese Economic Development Council
The Chinese Economic Development Council (CEDC) is a
nonprofit, tax-exempt, community development corporation
funded by the Office of Economic Development (housed in the
Community Services Administration of the federal
government). CEDC's mandate is to improve the
socio-economic conditions of the Chinese-American community
in the Greater Boston area as well as to preserve, share,
and enhance its cultural heritage. CEDC began operations in
June 1975 with venture capital and administrative funds
granted by the Community Services Administration (CSA) under
Title VII of the Community Services Act of 1974. Although
CEDC focuses its economic development efforts on Boston's
Chinatown, South Cove, South End, Combat Zone and Leather
District, its areas of concern and program initiatives
extend to the larger Chinese-American community in
metropolitan Boston.
CEDC programs are carried out by its three divisions:
Business Development, Community Development, and Housing and
Land Development. The Business Development Division
identifies industrial and commercial investment
opportunities that will return income to CEDC's special
impact area, create jobs for its residents, and provide
ownership opportunities for local entrepreneurs.
The Community Development Division coordinates
- 10 -
community, government, and business resources to meet the
objectives of CEDC's community development programs: a
Newcomers Services Center, a Manpower Development Program
(including a Chef Training Program), a Language Laboratory,
and a Center for Chinese Arts and Culture.
The Housing and Land Development Division (upon which
this thesis is focused) identifies, evaluates and develops
real estate investment opportunities to benefit Chinatown
residents, particularly in the area of housing. This
Division works in tandem with CEDC's for-profit subsidiary
corporation, CEDC Realty Corporation, that holds title to
two properties: 31 Beach Street and Oxford Street. (CEDC
controls this subsidiary both financially and legally,
through ownership of 100% of CEDC Realty Corporation stock,
and through the composition of the Board of Directors.)
CEDC utilizes the "community approach" to economic
development. However, like many other non-profit
community-based enterprises, CEDC must overcome structural
problems constraining profit-seeking enterprises. The
organization must deal with the barriers endemic to its
non-profit and government-supported nature. Its problems
are further exacerbated by the changing funding priorities
of the current Administration and the difficult national
economic climate as of late.
A major consequence of federal budget-cutting for the
CEDC is the elimination of 100% of its operating and venture
- 11 -
capital funding from the Community Services Administration,
effective September of 1982. In order to facilitate a
self-sufficiency status from the OED Title VII funds, the
CEDC has developed a strategic plan to serve as a conceptual
framework to guide the organization in the medium and
long-term future. Its mandate will remain intact, but
specific organizational priorities and strategies are under
revision. The pressures of immediate survival have
necessitated an assessment of existing assets and evolving
ventures which emphasize the likelihood of generating
administrative funds and equity funds, and takes the form of
a major reorganization.
The new administration is designed to clearly separate
competing responsibilities and establish specialization in
certain activities. The organization is to be separated
into the Development, Accounting, and Operations Divisions.
The Development group will remain responsible for all facets
of development until such time as income is produced by a
venture. The Accounting group will continue to monitor and
produce financial statements for both development and
operations on a regular basis. The Operations group will
assume responsibility for income-producing ventures under an
orderly transition procedure developed under the control of
the administration.
Under the old structure, both the 31 Beach Street and
Oxford Street projects were the responsibility of the
- 12 -
Housing and Land Development Division. Under the proposed
reorganization plan, the 31 Beach Street property would come
under the purview of the Operations Group because it is a
stable, income-producing venture. The Oxford Street
project, however, would be placed with the Development Group
until such time as the project is financed, constructed,
occupied, and producing steady revenues.
- 13 -
Evaluation of the Housing and Land Development Division
The essential difference between an operations
evaluation and a program evaluation is that one is an
evaluation of process (it focuses on an organization's
efficiency), and the other is an evaluation of results (and
focuses instead on an organization's effectiveness).
Sometimes called a "zero-base review," an operations
evaluation involves examining each function from scratch,
rather than utilizing the existing spending level as a
base. For managerial control purposes, Anthony and
Herzlinger suggest this review perhaps be conducted once
every four or five years in order to determine how to
conduct more efficiently the agency's activities.
A program evaluation, on the other hand, should be
conducted. less frequently, due to the significant amount of
staff time required to undertake such an evaluation (8). No
less important than an operations review, there is a
periodic need to determine whether benefits of particular
programs continue to exceed its costs, and whether any
methods could be employed to improve its effectiveness.
- 14 -
(8) Ibid., p. 151.
Program Management Evaluation
A program evaluation involves an identification of the
program's objectives, and then a judgment as to the degree
to which those objectives were attained. In addition, the
issue of whether the benefits of a particular program exceed
the costs must be explored. In my evaluation of the Housing
and Land Development Division's management of its two
projects, both monetary and non-monetary evaluation measures
are utilized. Both types of criteria are necessary to
include because of the way those projects are structured,
and because inclusion of both measures produces a more
useful evaluation model (that can more easily be applied in
other nonprofit situations).
Oxford Street
Project Description
The Oxford Street project is a 39-unit family housing
proposal located on Oxford Street, approximately one-half
block from the heart of Boston's Chinese Business District.
It consists of a vacant building formerly part of the New
England Telephone Company switching station at Harrison
Avenue, and a vacant parcel of land that has been collecting
debris, garbage, and illegally parked cars for more than
twenty years. The proposal utilizes a number of government
- 15 -
programs: Department of Housing and Urban Development
Section 8 housing subsidies for all 39 units, Federal
Housing Administration Insurance, Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency construction and permanent loans,
Massachusetts Community Development Block Grant funds and
Chapter 121A Tax Agreements, and equity financing from the
Community Services Administration.
The vacant land and building are surrounded by
residential and community area along Oxford Street and
Oxford Place. The buildings
story residential structures
other side of Oxford Street c
auditorium, and the offices o
Benevolent Association. Furt
groundfloor areas such as an
printer, a beauty shop and a
have apartments above them.
vacant building contain all n
utilities; it is located one-
along Oxford Place are all 4-5
while the buildings along the
ontain a Chinese school, an
f the Chinese Consolidated
her along Oxford Street are
ice cream store, a Chinese
grocery store, all of which
The streets surrounding the
ecessary services and public
half block from the
restaurants, stores, and community facilities that are the
fabric of Chinatown.
The building to be renovated for 39 units of family
housing is of brick and steel fireproof construction with
concrete floors. It is presently a four-story building,
however, the high ceilings of the first and fourth floors
will allow for the removal of the existing first floor and
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roof, and the construction of a new first, second, fifth,
and sixth floors. This will allow for the development of 39
family housing units instead of 28 to 30 units, save
valuable space in the building that would otherwise be
wasted, and make the project more feasible economically.
The vacant parcel of land will be developed as a sitting
park and a pedestrian way connecting Oxford Place to Oxford
Street. There are no such amenities anywhere in Chinatown
at the present time. In addition, CEDC has received
assurances from the Neighborhood Development Agency that
they regard Oxford Place as a high priority project, and
will attempt to provide adequate funds for reconstruction of
the street and sidewalks.
Form of Ownership and the Development Team
Oxford Place Associates is a limited partnership between
CEDC Realty Corporation and CEDC, Inc. (the non-profit) for
the purpose of developing and investing in real estate in
the City of Boston. The purpose of this structure is to
allow the Realty Corporation to develop, own, and manage
real estate assets for the parent corporation so that the
parent will have the strong financial base necessary to
participate in federal and state programs required to
undertake large scale housing and development programs.
In this project CEDC Realty will be the general partner
and will have a 2% interest in the partnership, while CEDC,
- 17 -
Inc. will be the limited partner and have a 98% interest in
the partnership. CEDC, Inc. will bring to the partnership
the land and buildings to be developed as the Oxford Place
Project, and will transfer title to this property to the
CEDC Realty Corporation.
CEDC, Inc. will then become the withdrawing limited
partner when the Oxford Place Project is syndicated and will
use the syndication proceeds as funding for other community
development programs. CEDC Realty Corporation will remain
as the general partner in Oxford Place Associates and will
retain responsibility for developing and managing the
project as required by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development and the MassachuseEts Housing Finance
Association.
The other members of the development team are as follows:
1. General Contractor: Barkan Construction
2. Architect: John Sharratt Associates
3. Syndicator: American Realty Team, Inc.
Goals and Objectives
Since actual project output is, or at least should be,
related to an organization's objectives, the first step
toward output measurement should be an examination of the
goals of CEDC in general, and of the Housing and Land
Development Division in particular.
The development activities to take place in downtown
Boston in the next several years pose direct threats to
- 18 -
Chinatown in two ways. First, the land uses represented by
current development (on the part of private parties and the
City of Boston) conflict with the residential nature of
Boston's Chinatown and remove scarce available land
resources from future community uses. Second, the expected
investment of from $390 million to $1.4 billion in these
projects is contributing significantly to escalating land
prices (9).
The Housing and Land Development Division of CEDC
addresses the need for greater utilization and community
control of land for the benefit of Chinese residents. The
following goals are stressed: (10)
1. To increase land control.
2. To increase the quantity and quality of the housing
stock.
3. To increase the quantity and quality of commercial
space.
4. To increase the quantity and quality of industrial
space.
5. To provide Chinese people with the opportunity to
live and work in Chinatown.
Although it is clear that goals are statements of intended
output, they are normally not quantified, and therefore
(9) U.S., Chinese Economic Development Council, Refunding
Proposal, submitted to the Office of Economic Development,
Community Services Administration, for the Boston Chinese
American Community (Boston: CEDC, June 20, 1979),
Introduction.
(10) Ibid.
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cannot be used directly as a basis for a measurement system.
An objective is a specific result to be achieved within
a specified time period, and can be a more useful tool
towards output measurement. Therefore, I have attempted to
translate the goals (listed below) of the Oxford Place
Project in particular into reasonable objectives, given
CEDC's resources and priorities.
Goals Objectives
1. To increase the quantity
and quality of the housing
stock.
2. To increase land control.
3. To create a strong physical
image that will enhance the
attractiveness and
visibility of Chinatown.
4. To provide opportunities
for Chinese people to enter
the construction trades.
5. To provide the opportunity
for Chinese people to live
and work in Chinatown.
1. Provide housing within
5 years that:
a. Is affordable to
the majority of
Chinatown.
b. Is "up-to-code."
c. Is appropriately
sized.
d. Partially
fulfills the
housing demand.
2. Purchase (or obtain
long-term leases or
options to) parcels of
land within or abutting
Chinatown.
3. Build a project that is
architecturally
attractive; provide
appropriate amenities.
4. Secure commitments from
general contractor that
a significant number of
Chinese persons will be
employed on the project.
5. Provide housing or job
opportunities for
Chinese persons within
or nearby Chinatown.
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6. To remain financially
solvent.
7. To generate capital for
future projects.
6. Enter into a project
that will:
a. At least "break
even," given
reasonable
estimations of
the cost of
capital.
b. Not expose CEDC
to unreasonable
amounts of risk,
both financial
and nonfinancial.
7. Syndicate project for
maximum financial
returns, as quickly as
possible.
Performance Measurement
The most useful way .to neasure performance, given these
complex goals and objectives, is through the use of an
output vector. Essentially, an output vector is an array o
indicators, aggregated to provide patterns, trends, and
indicators of output quality and organizational performance
(11).
In order to evaluate the project's efficiency and
effectiveness (under current management), I used a method
described in Anthony & Herzlinger's Management Control in
Nonprofit Organizations (12), in which a standard numerical
(11) Robert Anthony & Regina Herzlinger, Management
Control, pp. 236-38.
(12) Ibid.
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measure of achievement is developed. The real line (0,1)
represents a failure/success continuum, where O=complete
failure and l=complete success. The point 0.6 was
designated the minimum desirable level of achievement (the
target); any score in excess of 0.6 would show the degree to
which a target had been surpassed. A score of 0.4 was taken
to indicate that the project would potentially fail an
objective; any score below 0.4 would show a proportionally
greater degree of failure. The interval (0.4, 0.5)
represented a "blurred region" suggestive of failure and
(0.5, 0.6) a "blurred region" indicative of success (See
Table 1 attached).
The measures used in this assessment regime are
primarily "results measures," i.e. measures of output
expressed in terms that are related to the Division's
objectives. The value weights placed on each component of
this output vector (the last column on the attached chart)
reflect "my best guess" of the values of the staff at CEDC.
A "4" represents a high priority target and a "1" represents
a low priority.
Take the first objective, "provide housing," for
example. The first target stated is for the housing to be
provided within a five-year time span, starting from the
beginning of the planning stage. Moving to the "outcome
measure" column, our scale indicates that a 0.4 signifies
that the housing would not be provided within this time
- 22 -
Potential Project Effectiveness Vector
Assessment Regime Outcome Achieve-
Objective Target Outcome Measure Weight ment
Provide housing Within 5 years x=0.4 if no 4 Yes 0.60
=0.6 if yes
Achievement=x
Is "up-to-code" Same as above 1 Yes 0.60
50% of units at Portion of units 2 44% 0.53
least 2-bdrm. size provided that have
at least 2-bdrms.
100 multi-family =0.2 if 30 uts. 2 39 unit 0.30
units provided x=0.4 if 50 uts.
=0.6 if 100 uts.
=0.8 if 150 uts.
Purchase or lease Purchase by 1980 x=0.4 if no 3 Yes 0.60
land in Chinatown =0.6 if yes
Achievement=x
uild an attractive Have top archit. Same as above 1 Yes 0.60
roject; provide firm as designer
menities Provide amenities Same as above 1 Yes 0.60
.mploy Chinese in Secure commitment Same as above 1 No 0.40
onstruction from general
rades contractor
emain financially At least "break- Same as above 4 Yes 0.60
olvent even" at weighted
cost of capital
minimize expenses: Same as above 2 Yes 0.60
obtain 121A tax
agreement
Minimize risk: Same as above 12 Yes 0.60
obtain Section 8
rent guarantees
Syndicate project Net at least Same as above 3 Yes 0.85
or maximum $300,000
e t u r n s I _IIIII
period, and a 0.6 that the housing would indeed be provided
within five years. The outcome of the evaluation was "yes,"
i.e. the housing would be provided within this time frame.
Thus, the "achievement' of this target is a 0.60, indicating
that the project is effective in meeting one of the
organizational goals of CEDC. This particular target has a
weight of 4, signaling that this is one of the highest
priorities of the organization.
Referring to the following table, you can clearly see
that this project would attain to a significant degree the
goals that have been articulated for it. Of the twelve
goals, nine of them are projected to achieve at least a
0.60, its minimum target level of achievement. The three
that are projected to achieve less than this target level
are not the highest priorities to the organization (given a
weight of 2 or 1). Although it would be desirable to
achieve these other targets, it is not as important to the
organization as those targets with a weight of 3 or 4.
It is possible to devise a singular measure of total
project effectiveness, should the reader decide one is both
necessary and valid. To do so, the following equation would
be appropriate:
(sum of all target weights)(target achievement level)
sum of each (target weight)(respective achievement level)
For this project, the numerator of the equation would be
15.41,
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i.e. [ = (4)(.6) + (1)(.6) + (2)(.53) + (2)(.3) +
(3)(.6) + (1)(.6) + (1)(16) + (1)(.4) + (4)(.6) +
(2)(.6) + (2)(.6) + (3)(.85) = 15.41].
The denominator would be 15.6, i.e. (26)(0.60). Therefore,
the total "effectiveness rating" for the project would be
15.41/15.6, or 99%. However, I do not feel such an overall
singular number is valid in attempting to measure
effectiveness, because it implies a methodological precision
that has just not been attained.
Other types of output measures could also have been
included in this output vector, of course. For example, one
productivity and efficiency measure of the "provision of
housing" objective could be to calculate the following
ratio: monetary value of housing produced/CEDC's equity
contribution to the project. This would measure how
efficiently this project attains its objectives. However,
the usefulness of this measure could be called into
question, due to the idiosyncracies of this particular
project. For example, land in Chinatown is extremely
expensive compared to'other areas of Boston. Second, the
rehabilitation costs of this project are extremely high
because of the numerous logistical problems involved. As a
result of these two factors, the "cost per unit" projections
for this project are extremely high, producing a distorted
-- and therefore relatively useless -- efficiency rating.
Another measure of productivity could have been devised
for the employment objective: number of man-years-worth of
- 25 -
jobs that this project created for Chinese persons, compared
to the number of man-years that were required to get this
project accomplished. Unfortunately, there was insufficient
information to predict project success in this regard.
The last type of tool that could have been used was
social indicators. Social indicators are broad measures of
output which are significantly the result of the work of the
organization. In this case, indicators such as the
reduction in housing overcrowding or the amounts of income
redistributed with regard to Chinatown may have been
examined. The serious deficiency with this is that although
these indicators reflect the activities of the Housing and
Land Development Division, they are also affected by
numerous and complex exogenous forces. General
unemployment, environmental influences, and inflation could
significantly affect these indicators. Using these measures
without recognizing the effects of these factors could
result in some erroneous conclusions regarding the
effectiveness of the organization (and the 'effectiveness
potential' of this particular project).
Conventional Real Property Financial Analysis
The project is financed through three sources: 1) cash
expended for project feasibility studies, previous to
project approval and loan negotiations, in the amount of
$103,141; 2) equity contributions required of CEDC by MHFA
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(for loan approval) of $566,930; and 3) a 30-year permanent
loan from MHFA to CEDC in the amount of $1,837,831 (refer to
Appendix A). In terms of "pure capital costs," however, the
value of the building after rehabilitation is $2,342,961
(loan + equity required by MHFA - value of the land). Based
on projections by the general contractor of project costs
(Appendix B) and operating expenses (Appendix C), the
project generates a before tax cash flow of $12,253 in the
first year (Appendix D).
Further analysis reveals the following purchasing and
operating comparables (Appendix D):
1. Price/unit: mortgage amount/unit = $47,124
: mtge. + equity contrib./unit = $61,661
2. Total operating expenses/unit = $2,161
3. Operating expenses/gross revenue per unit = 24.60%
4. Real estate taxes/gross revenue = 12%
5. Average monthly rent per unit = $730.82
(paid by the tenant and HUD)
6. Estimated project occupancy = 99%
The price/unit and monthly rent/unit may seem a little
steep; this is primarily attributable to the unusually
complicated, and therefore more expensive, rehabilitation
requirements. In addition, under normal circumstances, a
99% occupancy level would be considered unreasonably
optimistic. Given the 'financials' of this project, a
95.42% occupancy level would be required merely to "break
even." However, all units in this project have been
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designated HUD Section 8 eligible. This makes the occupancy
levels and rents receivable almost risk-free for a number of
reasons: there will always be low- and moderate-income
persons eligible for the project, such tenants will only
have to pay up to 30% of their income in rent, and the
remainder of the rent will be paid by the federal
government. Risks of foreclosure (Appendix E) are also
almost negligible for the same reasons.
Projected cash flows for the project are delineated in
Appendix E. A "weighted cost of capital" was utilized for
discounting cash flows to obtain a net present value for the
project of $197,000 (this assumes a 15-year time horizon,
and that the project is not sold at the end of that time).
The discount rate of 9% was calculated by combining the cost
of CEDC's sources of funds for this project: 1) 4.11%
financed at 0% (in-house operating capital, and restricted
such that there are no opportunity costs associated with
it); 2) 22.61% financed at 6% (venture capital that has a 6%
opportunity cost); and 3) 73.48% financed at 11% (debt to be
issued by MHFA for this project). Cash inflows stem from
three sources: 1) after tax cash flows, 2) developer's
profit, and 3) proceeds from syndication of depreciation tax
shelters.
The project will net approximately $450,000 in
syndication proceeds. Not only does this structure still
retain ownership of the land, but it generates cash that can
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then be used for further community development projects.
Since the majority of tax benefits that accrue from the
accelerated depreciation treatment could not be fully
utilized by CEDC Realty, the sale of them represents no loss.
After examination of the total costs and benefits, and
the Realty Corporation's cost of capital, the most feasible
course of action is to hold on to the property past the
15-year time horizon previously articulated by the project
manager. Due to a combination of factors (the high mortgage
amount, the accelerated depreciation schedule, and the low
sale price based on capitalized rental income), sale of the
asset at this time would result in a net loss of $104,101.
Sale of the property at this time without "losing money"
could only be possible if the land value increased nearly
1000% -- clearly an unreasonable expectation.
It is clear that, overall, given CEDC's programmatic
objectives, the Oxford Place project is a sound investment
(refer to Appendix G). The project returns nearly 9% of net
operating income (capitalization rate analysis); given a
15-year time horizon, all equity contributions are recouped
on both a simple and discounted (09%) analysis; and the
project produces a net present value of $197,850 given a 9%
weighted cost of capital. The project's internal rate of
return is 6%, which is a reasonable return for a
limited-dividend corporation.
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In addition, the project produces 39 units of badly
needed housing for the low- and moderate-income residents.
The majority of the units are 2- and 3-bedroom apartments,
appropriate to the demand for multi-family units.
Furthermore, the project provides a few amenities not common
in this part of Boston: a community center on the 1st floor
and a landscaped sitting area on the abutting parcel. A
"positive externality" is also produced: major street and
sidewalk improvements financed through the use of Community
Development Block Grants.
General Management of the Project
The validity of the previous analysis depends, of
course, on the accuracy of the information made available to
the evaluator and that planned activities do indeed take
place. The efficiency and effectiveness ratings are based
on the Oxford Street housing project being developed for the
quoted construction costs, that the stated mortgage and
other funds sources are retained, that the project is
operational (occupied and generating income) within one
year, and the syndication payments are of the magnitude
estimated.
The CEDC project managers should be commended for
bringing the project to this point (given the nature of the
real estate industry and the uncertainty involved when
dealing with governmental agencies), and in particular for
- 30 -
leveraging the various sources of funds and in-kind
contributions to "make it go." However, management of this
project was deficient in several respects. Generally poor
coordination and inexperience are probably responsible for
the extraordinarily prolonged development process (although
this project has "been in the works" for five years, final
contracts have yet to be signed and construction
commenced). More importantly, however, although vague and
incomplete cost projections were done in order to secure
initial venture capital, a systematic and detailed analysis
of financial and nonfinancial aspects of the project was
never conducted. For example, commonplace financial ratios
such as net present value, internal rate of return, and
capitalization rates were never calculated. (Note that the
calculations found in this thesis are solely the work of the
author, not the CEDC project manager.). Performance of
those tasks should be required, and indicative of a
businesslike attitude, regardless of the organization's
profit or nonprofit nature.
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31 Beach Street
Project Description
CEDC purchased an 11-story office building in 1979,
located at 31 Beach Street (hence the project name), in the
heart of the Chinatown commercial district. Both Beach
Street and Harrison Avenue are major pedestrian and
vehicular thoroughfares and are considered major commercial
arteries of the Chinese community. The Shawmut Bank of
Boston, a well-recognized landmark of the community,
occupies the groundfloor of the building. As such, the
building is sometimes referred to by community residents as
the Shawmut Bank Building.
The building was constructed between 1915 and 1920 of
concrete and steel structure with brick facade. It occupies
a total land area of 7,200 square feet. The usable floor
area of the eleven floors and a usable basement totals
approximately 63,000 square feet.
The purpose of the investment was three-fold:
1. Primarily, the asset was purchased to provide home
offices for the CEDC Community Services Division (now an
autonomous unit). The building was ideal for the housing of
this division because of its central location upon which the
success of a service program depends.
2. The purpose of the property would enable CEDC to
establish a significant equity base in preparation for
future development activities which would require CEDC to
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show substantial net worth. This was particularly important
in the near-term housing development activities which the
CEDC was planning to undertake on this and/or on other sites.
3. The building appeared to be well-suited for housing
conversion. Preliminary investigation indicated the
possibility of putting 44 housing units into the building.
Evaluation
Effectiveness evaluation of this project is much simpler
than the previous one, because goal attainment was either
complete or nonexistent. Two of the goals were achieved
completely, whereas the housing goal was never seriously
pursued.
The space needs of the CEDC Community Service Division
and its programs were fulfilled, following the purchase and
renovation of 31 Beach Street. The location of the building
is ideal for the successful operation of direct service
programs since it is easily accessible by community
residents. As mentioned earlier, the building is situated
in the commercial core of Chinatown where residents work,
shop, and socialize. The staff envisions that the division
and its programs will serve as a focal point of community
activities in the future. The locational advantage will
certainly enhance maximal usage of the facilities.
Purchase of the building added significantly to CEDC's
net worth, indirectly furthering community development
activities by demonstrating credibility and financial
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strength in preparation for future commercial and housing
development projects. As an illustration of the importance
of having an adequate equity base, the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) requires housing developers, such as
the CEDC, to show 10-15% of a project's total cost as a
requisite of granting an FHA guaranteed mortgage. This is
to insure that CEDC will have the financial power to
complete the project once approved by FHA. Ownership of 31
Beach Street enabled CEDC to obtain an FHA commitment for
insurance on its Oxford Street project (In addition, with
regard to future business development, the CEDC will need an
established equity base to collateralize debt financing).
For reasons that did not become evident in the
examination of CEDC records, 31 Beach Street was never
converted into housing (although the building was
well-proportioned for such a use and no changes in the shell
or facade would have been required to rehabilitate the
structure). Instead, CEDC has retained the building for
light-industrial purposes. All eleven floors are occupied
and generating sufficient rents to cover debt service; the
Shawmut Bank of Boston occupies the basement and 1st floor,
CEDC occupies the 2nd floor, and most of the remainder is
occupied by garment manufacturers.
Unfortunately, CEDC financial records with regard to
this property were incomplete and sketchy, making a detailed
financial analysis impossible.
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Operational Management
In the Chinese Economic Development Council daily
operational management tasks for all divisions are
aggregated to the overall organizational level.
Accordingly, all accounting, budgeting, and monitoring
originates and is housed in the Accounting Office. Both
projects of the Housing and Land Development Division (31
Beach Street and Oxford Street) are treated similarly by the
organization, and thusly are treated as one unit in this
section.
Financial Accounting
CEDC currently operates on a fund accounting system.
The controller is in the process of changing the system to a
computerized standard double-entry accounting system. This
system will conform to generally accepted accounting
principles for accrual accounting. In addition, CEDC has
instituted an encumbrance system utilizing purchase orders.
CEDC's former use of fund accounting reflects its
dependence on funds whose use was restricted (by the
grantor) to specific purposes. The system was set up in
such a way that the amounts spent for that purpose were
separately identified. Each fund is a separate entity, has
its own set of accounts, and is self-balancing. Although
operating activities were accounted for in an operating fund
(as would be expected under fund accounting), most other
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activities were categorized into "venture funds." Both the
31 Beach Street and Oxford Street projects were originally
granted venture capital from the Office of Economic
Development; spending authorization consisted of cash in the
fund and limited lines of credit with the Department of the
Treasury. CEDC failed to explicitly 'separate out' capital
activities from other activities, losing one of the major
advantages of fund accounting (that of reporting capital
transactions separately from operating transactions).
The decision to change from a fund accounting system to
a standard double-entry system (accrual basis), linked with
an encumbrance system was a sound one. Utilizing "generally
accepted accounting principles" (GAAP) to prepare
general-purpose financial statements circumvents the problem
of multicolumn statements endemic to fund accounting. (In
such multicolumn statements there is no single bottom-line
number that inarguably shows the results of operations, in
terms similar to a "net income" figure in business
statements). Use of the accrual basis assures the matching
of revenues and expenses in each period, with the difference
appearing as a sort of "net income."
Addition o-f encumbrance accounting to the overall
financial accounting system is a sound method to constantly
keep track of mounting future commitments (whether expenses
or expenditures). Because CEDC is legally restricted to
spend only up to that appropriated by its funding sources
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(plus internal retained earnings), the organization must be
very careful not to encumber (obligate) funds beyond fixed
budget restrictions.
Financial Controls Over Spending
CEDC has designated a budget manager to be responsible
for each administrative cost center. (Both 31 Beach Street
and Oxford Street come under one budget manager, but are
considered separate cost centers.) In addition, CEDC
segregates all cost center budget allocations and operates
such that no expenditures which clearly relate to another
specific cost center or venture are charged to general
administration.
Another principle CEDC adheres to is that books for
ventures as well as all administrative cost centers are
closed, and trial balances and financial statements on all
activities are prepared on a monthly basis. Furthermore,
CEDC performs (and presents to the Board of Directors) a
monthly analysis of actual versus budgeted expenditures, and
prepares an explanation of all variances and a year-to-date
summary for each quarter.
The installation of the venture fund accounting system
and the purchase order system in October of 1980 was
designed to increase control over expenditures and proper
allocation of income and expenses. All transactions are
supposed to be approved by Budget Managers and then checked
by the Accounting Office for accuracy before being signed by
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the Controller.
CEDC has submitted to the Office of Economic Development
(OED) annually, within thirty days of the end of the
venture's fiscal year, an updated business plan for each
venture. In instances where no significant modifications
have occurred, CEDC submitted a statement to that effect.
In toto, these measures seem to provide CEDC management
with very good controls over spending. Of particular note
are the monthly variance calculations. However, in order
for these variances to be effective, they must be taken
seriously by both top management and project managers. If
regarded as more than a measure to 'comply with the regs,'
these variances could significantly affect performance and
efficiency with regard to spending levels.
The formal drawdown and encumbrance system, combined
with the flow of spending authority (that follows the lines
of operating management responsibility) assures a
significant amount of control over unplanned or unreasonable
expenses. This system could be improved, however, with the
installation of "object restrictions." That is, more
control should be exercised over spending for certain line
items, although the primary focus should remain on
programs. As noted by Anthony and Herzlinger (13), there is
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(13) Ibid., p. 438.
a fine line between restrictions imposed in order to curb
imprudent spending and the restrictions that are unwise
because they unduly limit the manager's ability to make
decisions on resource allocations. These controls would be
easier to define for the 31 Beach Street project because of
its stable, income-producing nature. For the Oxford Street
property, on the other hand, it is problematic due to the
instability and unpredictability of the real property
development process.
Information Systems
The information system is centered on a fund accounting
(cash) basis, but is being revised to a standard
double-entry accounting system (accrual basis). All venture
monitoring and accounts payable are now automated.
CEDC has been granted an open-ended unconditional
("no-cost") loan of General Business System software and
hardware by Wang Laboratories (the 2200 MVP System), to be
used for the storing and processing of all accounting/
financial information, payrolls, and personnel records. In
addition, the agency leases Wang Word Processors (2
terminals and 1 printer) from Wang Labs at $140 per month.
The small size of the CEDC organization allows the
account structure to be simplified so that the program
structure and the responsibility structure are identical (at
least at the project level of analysis). A program
structure is usually designed to meet the needs of planners
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and analysts, and emphasizes the full costs of carrying out
programs. The responsibility structure, on the other hand,
caters to the needs of operating managers (and therefore
emphasizes the controllable costs of operating responsiblity
centers). Top management can summarize information from
both structures to resolve conflicts as equitably as
possible.
In this case, the Housing and Land Development Division
is both a program and a responsibility node. It is treated
in the accounts as an expense ("cost") center: a
responsibility center for which inputs are measured, but for
which there is no monetary measure of output. This, I feel,
is a grave error in judgment, particularly in light of the
immediate financial pressures confronting the agency as a
whole. Instead, the Division should be treated -- both in
the accounts and in the eyes of management -- as a profit
center.
A profit center is a responsibility center for which
both revenues and expenses are measured. It should be noted
that a profit center need not earn a profit, or even break
even (though it would seem the latter is highly desirable as
a prerequisite for continued operation, and a necessity to
attain future financial self-sufficiency). The desired
relationship between revenues and expenses should be a
matter of management policy. The "beauty" of a profit
center, however, is that it resembles a business in
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miniature. The manager is forced to concern himself/herself
with both expenses and with furnishing a sufficient quantity
and quality of services to produce adequate revenues.
Therefore, managerial control over finances in a profit
center is more encompassing than in a cost center.
No such comparison of revenues and expenses (fixed and
variable, full and controllable) was done for either 31
Beach Street or Oxford Street in the ongoing information
accounts. In the case of the Oxford Street project, very
vague and incomplete cost projections were done in order to
secure initial venture capital; detailed projections of
revenues and expenses generated by the project on a
multi-year basis was never conducted as part of either a
project feasibility analysis or a prospective performance
measurement scale.
The same holds true for the 31 Beach Street project.
CEDC failed to conduct a detailed financial/nonfinancial
multi-year cost-benefit analysis for the project, both
initially and to determine ongoing feasibility. Once the
project was operating ("throwing off income"), the
organization hired a private firm to manage the building in
order to devote more staff time to develop new veintures.
Although this is perhaps justifiable in light of the small
size of the organization and its limited staff, the fact
remains that CEDC did not require the building manager to
provide detailed financial records of the operation.
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Without such information on total and specific revenue and
expenses, the organization was unable to (and did not
attempt to) determine fixed and variable costs, and thusly
controllable and noncontrollable items of expense on a
regular basis.
The organization should be commended for the
(financially) highly favorable terms on which it obtained
its Wang data processing and business hardware; the
increased technical capacity is very useful, while the lease
payments are almost negligible. It could be a relatively
simple task for the Housing and Land Development Division to
generate this financial profile of its real estate
operations, given the small size of its portfolio and its
Wang business hardware. This would make possible an
analysis by management of the merits of continuing projects
from an economic and social viewpoint, to be weighed against
the political implications (such as palatibility to those
that provide needed resources and other impacts on the
organization's constituencies) of proceeding with current
operations.
Budget Preparation
The budgeting methodology used for these two projects is
very complicated, which is probably due to the requirements
of CEDC's funding sources. CEDC applies to the Office of
Economic Development (OED) for operating funds annually;
applications for venture capital are granted if/when
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suitable proposals are submitted. Operating costs
(primarily personnel) for venture implementation are funded
with the annual OED grant, whereas all costs that are
formally part of the venture are covered by the special
venture grant.
Budgets are developed yearly for b ':h projects, using
the previous year's spending levels as a base. Alterations
to this case are calculated by taking into account factors
such as predicted changes in levels of operation (e.g.
continued or new construction, higher occupancy rates and
utility requirements), changes in inflation rates, and
changes in operating expenses (such as fuel and real estate
taxes).
Although this budgeting process may have worked for this
organization in the past, CEDC will have to change its
"modus operandi" drastically in order to assure its
continued existence. After September of 1982 all federal
financial support will be cut off, and both operating and
venture "revenues" must be completely internally generated.
Although one of the most effective budget analysis methods
entails starting from a "zero base," this may not be
feasible given the short time period between now and
September of 1982. Management must "take a long, hard look"
at all of the organization's projects, determine which
profit centers are (or have the potential to become)
self-sufficient, and match these to organizational goals and
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priorities. CEDC should also examine the feasibility of
"spinning off" certain of the operations (such as the Realty
Corporation or individual projects) to capitalize on
financial or legal advantages. As noted earlier, such an
analysis could be generated relatively easily for the 31
Beach Street project because of its stable income-producing
nature. Establishing a budget for Oxford Street would
involve crucial "educated guesses" on the part of management
with regards to the probability and timing of obtaining
financing, meeting construction and occupancy deadlines, and
returning a positive net cash flow to sustain operations.
Operational Auditing
CEDC currently undergoes compliance auditing every
fiscal year, in order to determine (to the satisfaction of
its grantors) whether the financial data is being properly
recorded and whether federal regulations on fund usage are
being complied with. According to its accountant (the
accounting firm of Deloitte, Haskins & Sells), CEDC's
financial statements dated from December 1978 through
September 1980 presented fairly the financial position of
the agency and the results of its operations and changes in
fund balances. The firm stated that it "found no material
weaknesses in internal accounting control, (14)" nor any
(14) Letters to Chinese Economic Development Council
Board of Directors, from Deloitte, Haskins & Sells (Boston,
11 February 1980 and 28 April 1981).
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expenditures considered to be questionable costs under CSA
guidelines.
However, the organization may wish to consider (at some
point in the future when its 'money woes' are less acute)
having an operational audit conducted. Such an audit
determines whether an entity is managing or utilizing its
resources (personnel, property, space, etc.) in an
economical and efficient manner, and seeks to identify any
inefficiencies or uneconomical practices (including
inadequacies in management information systems,
administrative procedures, or organizational structure).
Operational auditing could serve this organization well if
it showed how future decisions can be made in a better way.
Operating Capital Maintenance
Conceptually, CEDC would be said to be adequately
maintaining its capital if its net income at least equaled
its cost of equity capital, or if its revenues at least
equaled its expenses. Examination of the CEDC Realty
Corporation financial statements (that holds title to both
projects) since its inception in 1979 brings to light the
fact that the unit experienced net losses of $5,213 and
$19,353 for 1979 and 1980, respectively. It is clear that
neither objective (equating revenues and expenses, or
equating net income to cost of equity capital) was
attained. This "negative operating margin" indicates the
questionable state of the Realty Corporation's financial
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viability, and/or a reflection of the quality (or
deficiency) of asset management services.
In an attempt to monitor capital depletion more
carefully, the Accounting Office instituted a formal
drawdown system in January of 1981 to reflect a 30-day
maximum liability on cash balances. Each drawdown is
required to be supported by on-hand invoices, purchase
orders, and (based on past experience) a weekly estimate for
the remaining weeks of the month. The support is supplied
to the Members of the Board of Directors responsible for
signing drawdown vouchers.
The addition of this drawdown procedure is an
improvement over the present system in that it is an
explicit recognition of the need for such monitoring.
However, further measures are necessary to bring about
improvement in performance, i.e. to "rein in managers" so
that expenses are minimized and revenues maximized. Active
support on the part of the Board of Directors and senior
management will be required to set firm policy in this
respect, using expense data as a basis for control.
Adherence to the "profit center" approach discussed earlier
is important to success in this effort.
Behavioral Considerations
The previous discussions have touched on the technical
aspects of a system that assures managerial control over
operations. The attitudes of those who use the information
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produced by the system and those who are affected by this
information is at least as, if not more, important than
technical matters.
"A central purpose of any control system is to motivate
operating managers to take actions that help accomplish the
organization's objectives efficiently and effectively"
(15). In an effort to motivate and retain key employees,
CEDC instituted in 1980 an Incentive Plan that provides
employees compensation for superior levels of performance.
The structure of the plan follows the basic principles of a
traditional Bonus Plan rather than a Profit-Sharing Plan,
due to the difficulties of defining traditional "profits" in
a non-profit organization
Theoretically, this could be a very effective method to
overcome the disincentives inherent in the relatively low
compensation schedules for top management in the CEDC.
However, in practice the Incentive Plan is completely
ineffective because it has never been funded. As originally
formulated, funds available for the Plan would be those not
controlled by any governmental agency, i.e. "unrestricted
funds." Tight fiscal conditions have precluded any
diversion of funds to the Incentive Plan.
Another inadequacy of CEDC's management system is the
(15) Robert Anthony and Regina Herzlinger, Management
Control, p. 448.
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lack of a formal and systematic personnel evaluation
system. Performance criteria -- particularly ones tied to a
compensation or promotion schedule -- are completely
nonexistent. Such a system is key towards providing
information on the performance of specific managers and
projects so that problems in goal setting, strategy
formulation, or program implementation can be identified and
appropriate steps be taken to resolve these problems.
- 48 -
Performance With Regard to Non-profit Constraints
As noted previously (pp. 7-8), there are certain
characteristics of non-profit organizations that affect the
managerial control process in those agencies. It would be
useful to examine at this time how CEDC's non-profit nature
has impacted the effectiveness of its managerial control
processes.
1. CEDC has encountered evaluation problems
similar to that of other non-profit
organizations, due to the absence of a
singular measure of performance (similar to
the profit measure). Performance
measurement and comparisons between costs
and benefits are not carried out on a
regular, consistent, and objective basis.
2. CEDC is somewhat constrained in its
activities because of its complete
dependence on a very narrow funding base.
Although CEDC is not prevented (for the most
part) from engaging in a wide variety of
community, land, and business activities, it
is prevented from earning a maximum
financial return. For instance, both CSA
and MHFA placed a 6% rate-of-return ceiling
to CEDC from the Oxford Place project. This
limited financial return may not be
sufficient to fund ongoing operations, due
to present financial constraints.
3. CEDC has, until now, been completely
public-supported, i.e. CSA has provided 100%
of both its operating and venture capital.
There has been no formal/strict link between
the amount of financial support provided by
CSA and the level of service provided to the
community (such as housing, technical
assistance, or business loans) by CEDC.
Therefore, planning future levels of service
provision or goods production is difficult,
given CEDC's present financial plight and
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the uncertainty of future investment by
outside parties.
In addition, program managers must often
compete among themselves for scarce
financial resources. This has, in the past,
led to counterproductive in-fighting,
information-hoarding, and delays.
Furthermore, programs must sometimes be
drastically altered and contorted in order
to satisfy the demands of those providing
resources to the agency.
4. Like many other non-profit organizations,
CEDC's Board of Directors have a difficult
time arriving at and balancing between
courses of action that best serve its impact
community and actions consistent with purely
businesslike operations.
5. As mentioned previously, CEDC's top managers
receive relatively low monetary compensation
for their respective positions (that is, in
comparison with the salaries that could be
expected from an average for-profit concern,
given commensurate responsibilities).
6. CEDC has adopted some of the 20th-century
accounting and management control concepts,
including accrual accounting, budgeting, and
variance analysis. The organization does
not, however, calculate standard costs, or
practice cost accounting, responsibility
accounting, or detailed programming.
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Organizational Response to Environmental Pressures
New Organizational Structure
As noted previously, the new administration is designed
to clearly separate competing responsibilities and establish
specialization in certain activities. The organization is
to be separated into the Development, Accounting, and
Operations Divisions. The Development group will remain
responsible for all facets of development until such time as
income is produced by a venture. The Accounting group will
continue to monitor and produce financial statements for
both development and operations on a regular basis. The
Operations group will assume responsibility for
income-producing ventures under an orderly transition
procedure developed under the control of the administration.
Impact on Operating Activities
Under the old structure, both the 31 Beach Street and
Oxford Street projects were the responsibility of the
Housing and Land Development Division. Under the proposed
reorganization plan, the 31 Beach Street property would come
under the purview of the Operations Group because it is a
stable, income-producing venture. The Oxford Street
project, however, would be placed with the Development Group
until such time as the project is financed, constructed,
occupied, and producing steady revenues.
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Recommendations
Many of CEDC's managerial problems stem from the lack of
clear direction received by the staff from the Board of
Directors. There appears to be a good deal of confusion and
ambiguity as to just who (the staff or the Board of
Directors) has the authority to make specific policy and
programmatic decisions. This issue should be clarified as
soon as possible, particularly given CEDC's immediate
financial predicament. In addition, the Board should
clarify its (or set new) policies regarding the following
programmatic and operational guidelines:
1. Revised (and/or streamlined) overall organizational
goals, strategies, and priorities.
2. Allocation of staff to management of particular
ventures, with a "clear eye to" organizational priorities
and timetables.
3. Clear and simple methods to analyze new and ongoing
ventures for feasibility, in both financial and other terms.
4. The desired relationship between revenues and
expenses, i.e. should the organization strive to "break
even," to generate a minimal 6% return on investment, or a
market return of at least 10-15%.
5. The possibility of "spinning off" particular
segments (for example, the CEDC Realty Corporation or
problematic ventures that could adversely affect current
"healthy" ventures).
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Additional steps should be taken to overcome the
structural weaknesses inherent in CEDC's non-profit nature.
(I refer to those particular characteristics mentioned on
pages 7, 8, 49 and 50 of this thesis.). These include the
following:
1. Use of an output vector such as that
illustrated on page 23 could be useful for
performance and effectiveness measurement
purposes. In addition, projects and
programs should be examined in terms of
conventional financial analysis, producing
surrogates for profit measures (such as
capitalization rates, internal rates of
return, and payback periods). Such measures
analyze both efficiency and effectiveness
simultaneously. Lastly, performance
evaluation criteria must be developed that
are clear, fair and consistently applied.
2. As of September 1982, CEDC will no longer be
severely constrained by its heavy dependence
on CSA funding. Funds will either be
internally generated or contributed by
outside investors; in either case it appears
that the organization will be free to choose
what types of activities to engage in and
what financial return to seek.
3. CEDC should take active measures to
establish a connection between its inputs
(budgeted ceilings) and its outputs (service
provided). The 'first step' would be to
'put into action' the recommmendations posed
in #1, i.e. efficiency and effectiveness
measures. Second, benefit/cost analyses and
alternative return measures should be
conducted, preferably under different
scenarios. Third, revenue and expenses
projections should be calculated on a
multi-year basis. Overall, a profit center
mentality must prevail. Although some parts
of CEDC will be exempt from 'profit-center
treatment' (e.g. administration, Executive
Director), it should be applied wherever
possible and appropriate.
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4. There is no easy solution to the problem of
balancing public/community needs and the
internal/business need of the organization
on the part of the Board of Directors.
5. The simplest way to overcome the
motivational problem of low monetary
compensation of top management is to place
as a top priority funding of the Incentive
Plan.
6. There are a number of recommendations that
are appropriate for CEDC's operational
management policies:
a. Consider operational auditing in the
future;
b. "Separate out" operating and capital
transactions in venture accounts;
C. Impose "object restrictions" on specific
(controllable) expense items; and
d. Treat all program units as profits
centers, with the possible exception of the
Executive Director and administrative
support.
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Appendix A
Oxford St.
Total Project Costs
Composition
Equity: 1. Outside (previous to) loan commitment $103,141
2. Included as part of MHFA loan
(construction & permanent
financing)
11.5% construction loan, 11 months &
11.0% permanent loan, 30 years.
$566,930
$1,837,831
$2,507,902
Salient Facts
1. Purchase price: Land
Building
61,800
27,000
2. Value of building after rehabilitation
(Loan + Equity - Land costs)
3. Depreciable Base
4. Depreciable Life
5. Method of Depreciation
$2,342,961
$2,342,961
15 years
175% declining balance;
switches to straight-line.
6. Estimated Sales Price in Year 15
(net operating income capitalized @
12%*, plus the value of the land)
7. Net Operating Income ("free & clear)
8. Amount of MHFA (1st) mortgage
a. Interest rate
b. Term
c. Amortization period
d. Constant
$1,874,908
$ 217,573
$1,837,831
11%
40 years
40 years
11.17187%
*12% discount rate suggested by Robert Leigh,
project manager.
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Debt:
Appendix B
Oxford St.
Summary of Estimated Project Costs ($)
Direct Construction Costs
Construction Fees
Surveys, Permits, etc.
Bond Premium
Architectural Design
Architectural Inspection
Clerk of the Works
Total Fees
Total Construction Costs
General Development Costs
Construction Loan Interest
(11 months, .115 rate)
Real Estate Taxes
Insurance
MHFA Site Inspection Fee
MHFA Application Fee
MHFA Financing Fee (2% loan)
Legal Fees
Title & Recording Expenses
Accounting & Cost Certif.
Rent-up & Marketing
Relocation
Appraisal Fees
Credit for Rental Income
Total Gen. Dev. Costs
Developer's Fee
Land & Building
Total Replacement Cost
Equity: Developer's Fee
Cash
Total
1,755,800
10,024
16,000
94,500
31,500
23,000
175,024
96,869
5,000
3,500
300
1,170
36,756
15,000
10,000
2,000
1,500
2,500
( -- )
210,542
356,388
1,930,824
174,595
210,542
88,800
2,404,761
(566,930)
1,837,831
76.4%
73.3%
45,021
47,124
Loan
Loan/Replacement Cost Ratio
Loan/Total Project Cost Ratio
Construction Cost Per Residential Unit
Mortgage Amount Per Residential Unit
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Appendix C
Oxford St.
Total Annual Operating Expense Schedule
I tem Expense
Management Fee
Administrative
Payroll Expenses, incl. taxes, etc.
Legal
Audit
Telephone
Office Supplies
Other Administrative
Sub-total -- administrative
Maintenance
Payroll Expenses, incl. taxes, etc.
Janitorial Materials
Landscaping
Decorating (interior only)
Repairs (interior & exterior)
Elevator maintenance
Garbage, trash & snow removal
Exterminating
Miscellaneous
Sub-total -- maintenance
Utilities
Electricity
Gas
Water & Sewer
Sub-total -- utilities
Utility Allowance (Section 8)
4,719
195
1,989
507
312
78
12,636
1,014
117
1,014
4,095
1,599
234
1,014
117
3,003
18,993
3,003
Insurance
Oper. Exp. Before Rep. Res.
Taxes (Real Estate, @12%)*
Replacement Reserve
Utility Allowance (Section 8 only)
Total Annual operating Expenses
Subtotal
11,700
7,800
21,840
24,999
12,144
5,500
83,983
40,746
12,438
(12,144)
125,023
*Chapter 121A Tax Agreement with City of Boston
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Appendix D
Oxford St.
First Year Project Set-Up
Gross Possible Income (rents) $342,024
- Vacancies (1% of G.P.I.) (3,420)
Effective Rental Income 338,604
+ Other Income (laundry) '3,992
Effective Gross Income (net rents) 342,596
- Operating Expenses (84,277)
- Real Estate Taxes (40,746)
Net Operating Income 217,573
("free & clear)
Finance Payments (205,320)
Before Tax Cash Flow $ 12,253
Purchasing & Operating Comparables
1. Price/unit: mortgage amount/unit $ 47,124
: mortgage + equity/unit $ 61,661
2. Total operating expenses/unit $ 2,161
3. Operating expenses/gross revenue 24.60%
4. Real estate taxes/gross revenue 12.00%
(Chapter 121A Tax Agreement)
5. Average monthly rent/apartment $730.82
6. Actual or project occupancy 99%
Break-Even Analysis
Current or project occupancy 99.00%
Break-even occupancy 95.42%
Margin 3.58%
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MlAinWIN1lh
PROJECfTED CASH FLOWS ($000s)
Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Free & clear 0 218
-Finance chrge 0 215-
Before tax
cash flow to
entire proj: 0 13-
CEDC: 0 .26
+ Amortization 0 3.16 3.51 3.89 4.32 4.80 5.32 5.91 6.56 7.28 8.08 8.97 9.96 11.05 12.27 13.62
-Depreciation 0 5.47 4.83 4.27 3.77 3.33 3.13 -4 0.20 0
-Interest mts 0 202 202 201 201 201 200 199 199 198 197 196 195 194 193 192
Taxae inome 0 (204) (203) (202) (200) (199) (198) (196) (195) (194) (192) (190) (188) (186) (181) (178)
Tax shelter
Benefit (a) 0 30.63 30.43 30.23 30.03 29.82 29.63 29.45 29.26 29.04 28.80 28.54 28.24 27.85 27.11 26.70
After tax cash
flow 0 30.89 30.69 30.49 30.29 30.08 29.89 29.71 29.52 29.30 29.06 28.80 28.50 28.11 27.37 26.96
Cash outlays
(equitv) (670) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cash Inflows:
Dev.profit: 0 210.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
S nd. roceed 270 180 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net after tax
cash flows
(assume no
sale) (470) -421 31 30 30 30 30 30 30 29 29 29 29 28 27 27
Net present
value (b) = 197
TAX CONSEQUENCES OF FORECL.OSURE ($000s)
Year
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Unpaid mtge.
balane 188 13 8 1 82 83 11 83 107 1801 1793 1785 1776 1766 1755 1743 11729
Net bk. value 2070 1828 1615 1426 1260 1260 1104 947 791 635 479 322 166 10 0 0
Taxable gain on
foreclosure - 7 216 401 563 558 709 860 1010 1158 1306 1454 1600 1745 1743 1729 X T
(a) 15% corporate tax rate applied; is applicable for corporations earning under $25,000 in
profits in 1983. Tax shelter will be used by the other projects in CEDC Realty's portfolio. O
(b) 9% discount rate utilized. This "weighted cost of capital" is a combination of the cost of .1
capital of CEDC's sources of funds:
(1) 4.11% financed at 0' (operating capital)
(2) 22.61% financed at 6%, (venture capital) C+
(3) 73.48% financed at 11% (MHFA loan for project) . t
LAND
BUILDING
TOTAL SALE PRICE
Sale price
Net book value
Gain on sale
No recapture (e)
Gain on sale
Capital gains tax
rate (f)
Cap. gains tax
Sale price
Income tax
Mtge. balance
Net cash from
Present value
sale
(g)
Net present value
(NPV) of "no
sale" option:
$197,850 (g)
Internal rate of
return: 6%
Alternative Scenarios For Sale of Project
SALE IN YEAR 15 SALE IN YEAR 28
$ 61,800
$1,813,108
$1,874,908
(a)
(b)
$1,874,908
- 0
$1,874,908
$1,874,908
x .28
$ 524,974
$1,874,908
- 524,974
-1,729,120
($ 379,186)
($104,101)
NPV:
$93,749 (g)
$ 588,467
$1,813, 108
$2,401,575
$2,401,575
0
$2,401,575
$2,401,575
x .28
$ 672,441
$2,401,575
- 672,441
-1,729,120
$ 14
$4
NPV:
$197,854
(c)
(b)
(g)
$ 61,800
$1,813,108
$1,874,908
$1,874,908
- 0
$1,874,908
$1,874,908
x .28
$ 524,974
$1,874,908
- 524,974
-1,333,011
$ 16,923
$1,515
(a)
(b)
$ 185,400
$1,813,108
$1,998,508
$1,998,508
0
$1,998,508
$1,998,508
x .28
$ 559,582
$1,998,508
- 559,582
-1,333,011
$ 105,915
$9,485
Notes:
(a) Original cost
(b) Capitalized income @ 12%
(c) 950% increase
(d) 300% increase
(e) no excess depreciation taken
(f) 28% capital gains tax rate applied
(g) discounted @ 9% weighted cost of capital
I I
(d)
0I
0 (D
7+
Appendix G
Oxford St.
Financial Analysis
Equity: 1. Outside (previous to) loan commitment $ 103,141
2. Included as part of MHFA loan 566,930
Total equity 670,071
Debt: MHFA loan
Total project costs
Simple Return Measures
Capitalization rate
Cash-on-cash return
increase in value 1. Sale price based on
capitalized rental income
2. Sale price based on
replacement cost
Discounted Return Measures
Net Present Value @ 9% weighted cost of capital
Internal Rate of Return (15-year time horizon)
Payback: 1. Simple payback
2. Discounted payback (@9%)
Proportionate Sources of Total Benefits
(at internal rate of return)
1,837,831
$2,507,902
8.68%
0.04%
2,000%
2,600%
$197,850
6.0%
8 years
15 years
Before Tax Cash Flow
Tax Benefits
Future Value (syndication proceeds &
developer's profit)
Total
Range of Taxable Income
Minimum Income
Maximum Income
($182,820)
($204,210)
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0.26%
29.85%
69.89%
100.0%
